Afghanistan: A New Definition of Victory
We can never win a war in Afghanistan. Not in the sense of V-E Day or JAPAN SURRENDERS!
Can you imagine a headline: RADICAL ISLAMICISTS SURRENDER?
No way!
Instead, they just produce more suicide fighters and dispatch them off to kill “infidels.”
So, we cannot—and will not—win in the traditional sense.
But we can accomplish our original reason for invading Afghanistan back on October 8th, 2001: prevent another 9/11 attack.
This should be our sole goal from now on. To prevent another 9/11 does not mean to re-build a nation that does not want us there, or to build a centralized government that they do not want. This whole COIN (counter-insurgency) style of fighting a war is a total sham. Not killing people while we throw billions of dollars at them is a fruitless endeavor.
Instead we need to do just enough to prevent Afghanistan from being used—again—as a training ground for future massive attacks on the US and our allies.
Disruption is a much easier goal than occupation and nation-building.
President Obama has made this war his war by doubling the troop contingent and massively spending to double the size of our three already-enormous bases there. Clearly there is a larger strategy at work: these three bases are meant to be permanent American hubs from which to project American military force throughout the region into Iran and Syria and anywhere else we so choose. The problem is that the American people have not been told of this plan—nor have they voted for it.
General Petreus’ ascension to be the Allied Commander in Afghanistan (actually a demotion of sorts for him which he accepted to save the mission) will only deepen American involvement in Afghanistan. Why? Because in one year—the summer of 2011–when Obama and Biden have said they want to start removing the recently surged US troops–if Petreus asks for more troops, which he did in Iraq and which the Pentagon has already indicated, then who will deny him? Who will dare oppose our only heroic general? Just look at the out-poring if support for his appointment on both sides of the aisle.
Conclusion: we are in an ill-chosen fight against an un-defined enemy (Taliban or Al-Qaeda, Afghans or Pakistanis?) with an un-focused Commander-in-Chief following an un-clear objective using a certain-to-fail strategy.
And that is a prescription for a disaster.